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Investigating Program Execution with PCA Traces

Use the Windows 11 PCA files and AppCompatFlags keys in an intrusion: what to flag, what is missing and why, how to find the user, with a worked example.

Published on 10 min read

TL;DR. In a Windows 11 intrusion, sort PcaAppLaunchDic.txt by time and start with programs in Downloads, ProgramData, Users\Public and other writable folders, double extensions, and dual-use tools such as rclone. Then think about what is missing: a child process or a tool started from cmd.exe never gets a line, so PCA is half of the story at best. The files have no user; take it from the path, from each NTUSER.DAT (Compatibility Assistant Store, Layers, UserAssist, RunMRU) and from BAM. Times are last launches, in UTC. PCA Parser joins the files and hives per executable, shows the timeline and flags the paths and events worth a look; the FIN-WKS-07 case below shows the method.

Where PCA fits

SourceWhat it adds
PcaAppLaunchDic.txtLast GUI launch per path, machine-wide, UTC
PcaGeneralDb0.txt, PcaGeneralDb1.txtAbnormal exits with exit codes, failed installers, PCA events, with product and program ID
Compatibility Assistant Store (NTUSER.DAT)Programs PCA dealt with for one user
AppCompatFlags Layers (NTUSER.DAT, SOFTWARE)Programs someone set to run elevated or in a compatibility mode
Prefetch, BAMExecution regardless of how the program was started; BAM per user
Amcache, the file itselfHash, signature, version, Mark of the Web
Event logs, EDRProcess creation with parent and command line, logons

What to look for

CheckWhy it mattersBenign look-alikes
Executable in Downloads, %TEMP%, AppData, C:\Users\PublicFolders any user can write to, where dropped tools landInstallers and updaters; Rathbun's published file has setup programs under ProgramData\Package Cache and an NVIDIA downloader
Executable directly in a C:\ProgramData subfolder named after a vendorA folder that looks like it belongs to installed softwareReal vendor components; check what the vendor installs there
Double extension (.pdf.exe, .docx.exe)A file made to look like a documentRare
Drive letter other than C:Removable media or a mapped sharePortable apps, software on a second disk
Dual-use tools: rclone, PsExec, archivers, remote-access toolsExfiltration, lateral movement, stagingAdministrators
First seen in the incident windowNew program, new behaviourUpdates, new software
Abnormal exits in PcaGeneralDb for the same pathCrashes, a tool killed by security softwareBuggy software
RUNASADMIN or RUNASINVOKER layer on a writable pathSomeone wanted the tool elevated, or wanted to avoid a promptOld software and games
A line with no pipe in PcaAppLaunchDic.txtRecording of new programs stopped thereA legitimate path with a non-ANSI character

None of these is a verdict on its own. Two or three on one path are worth a full look.

Worked example: FIN-WKS-07

FIN-WKS-07 is a fictional Windows 11 workstation; the people, account, files and times are invented and match the other examples on this site. On 2026-09-14, the finance user alice opens a fake invoice, and later a rogue local account, svc_backup, is used interactively to run tools and stage data. The responder collects the PCA folder, both users' NTUSER.DAT, the SOFTWARE and SYSTEM hives and the Prefetch folder at 10:55:12 UTC. All times below are UTC.

Step 1: read the launch log in time order

Last launchPath
08:58:40C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\OUTLOOK.EXE
09:12:07C:\Users\alice\Downloads\Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe
10:09:44C:\ProgramData\Intel\m64.exe
10:39:25C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7zFM.exe
10:47:12C:\Users\Public\rclone.exe

Step 2: flag the paths

  • Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe in alice's Downloads: a double extension and a download folder, 13 minutes after Outlook started. That fits an attachment saved and opened. Check the file's Zone.Identifier stream and Amcache for its SHA-1.
  • C:\ProgramData\Intel\m64.exe: an executable directly in a folder named after a hardware vendor, started from File Explorer at 10:09:44.
  • C:\Users\Public\rclone.exe: a file-sync tool often used for exfiltration, in a folder every user can write to.
  • 7zFM.exe is an ordinary program. What matters is when it ran: after 10:00, after svc_backup's first logon at 09:59:28.

Step 3: account for what is missing

Five known events have no line, and each absence is expected:

  • powershell.exe at 09:12:31 was started by the invoice executable. A child process is not a GUI shell launch. Look for it in Prefetch and in process creation events.
  • cmd.exe at 10:02:16 (opened from the Run dialog) and mstsc.exe at 10:18:40 both live in System32. Sygnia found that some built-in programs are not recorded when they run from their original folder, and no public test shows a Run dialog launch being recorded. BAM under svc_backup's SID has both; RunMRU in its hive has the Run dialog command.
  • C:\Users\svc_backup\Downloads\tools\PsExec64.exe at 10:21:03 was started from cmd.exe. Sygnia found that command-line launches and PsExec are not recorded. BAM, under svc_backup's SID, and Prefetch have it.
  • An earlier 7-Zip launch. svc_backup's Windows Timeline in the same case shows 7-Zip File Manager opening Downloads\tools.zip at 10:06:40. PcaAppLaunchDic.txt keeps one time per path, so only 10:39:25 is left.

How every source behaves is in why a program is missing from PCA.

Step 4: attribute each launch

PcaAppLaunchDic.txt is one file for the whole machine. User attribution comes from elsewhere:

PathUserEvidence
Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exealicePath in her profile; her NTUSER.DAT
m64.exesvc_backupLayers value ~ RUNASADMIN for this path in svc_backup's NTUSER.DAT, key LastWrite 10:10:05
7zFM.exe, rclone.exesvc_backupBAM entries under svc_backup's SID
PsExec64.exesvc_backupPath in its profile; BAM

The Layers value is the strongest link for m64.exe. svc_backup's profile was created during the intrusion, so its Layers key holds one value, and the key's LastWrite time, 10:10:05, is when someone in that session asked for m64.exe to always run as administrator: 21 seconds after its GUI launch. See AppCompatFlags Layers. Also read the Compatibility Assistant Store key in both hives: a path there ties it to the user whose hive it is.

Step 5: check the PcaGeneralDb files

Search both PcaGeneralDb files for m64.exe, rclone.exe and invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe. Paths there are lowercased, have no drive letter, and use %USERPROFILE% or %USERNAME% in place of the profile (PcaGeneralDb files). On FIN-WKS-07, PcaGeneralDb0.txt has two of them:

2026-09-14 09:12:34.118|2|%USERPROFILE%\downloads\invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe||||000645a9861156f0839a208ca20d51185d4800000904|Abnormal process exit with code 0x1
2026-09-14 10:09:46.207|2|%programdata%\intel\m64.exe||||00067be110d23f04885a6fc8fb6d093ea50a00000904|Abnormal process exit with code 0xc000042c
  • The invoice executable ended abnormally 27 seconds after its launch, after starting PowerShell. The empty product, company and version fields fit a file with no version information.
  • m64.exe exited two seconds after its launch with 0xc000042c, STATUS_ELEVATION_REQUIRED, and the RUNASADMIN value in svc_backup's hive was written 19 seconds later. It reads as someone retrying with elevation: a lead to check against the Security log and Prefetch, not proof on its own.

rclone.exe has no record, which is the normal case for a program that exited cleanly.

The timeline

Time (UTC)EventSource
08:58:40alice starts OutlookPcaAppLaunchDic.txt
09:12:07alice opens Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe from DownloadsPcaAppLaunchDic.txt, path in her profile
09:12:31powershell.exe started by the invoiceNot in PCA: Prefetch, process creation events
09:12:34The invoice executable exits abnormally (code 0x1)PcaGeneralDb0.txt, type 2
09:57:41Local account svc_backup createdSecurity log (4720)
09:59:28svc_backup logs on interactivelySecurity log (4624)
10:02:16cmd.exe from the Run dialogNot in PCA: BAM, RunMRU
10:06:407-Zip opens tools.zipWindows Timeline (overwritten in PCA)
10:09:44m64.exe started from File ExplorerPcaAppLaunchDic.txt
10:09:46m64.exe exits, elevation required (0xc000042c)PcaGeneralDb0.txt, type 2
10:10:05RUNASADMIN set for m64.exeLayers key LastWrite, svc_backup's NTUSER.DAT
10:18:40mstsc.exe startedNot in PCA: BAM
10:21:03PsExec64.exe started from cmd.exeNot in PCA: BAM, Prefetch
10:39:257-Zip File Manager, last launchPcaAppLaunchDic.txt
10:47:12rclone.exe started from C:\Users\PublicPcaAppLaunchDic.txt
10:55:12CollectionResponder's notes

Pivots

From a suspicious path:

  1. The file. Hash, signature, version information, Zone.Identifier, file system times. If it is gone, Amcache may still have its SHA-1.
  2. Prefetch. Run count and up to eight run times, which PCA does not keep, and the files the program loaded.
  3. The user's hive. Compatibility Assistant Store, Layers, UserAssist, RunMRU; for mstsc.exe, the Terminal Server Client keys that list the servers the user connected to.
  4. BAM. The last run per path, per SID.
  5. Event logs and EDR. Process creation with parent and command line, if they were enabled.
  6. Other hosts. mstsc.exe and PsExec point to the next machine to examine.

Anti-forensics to keep in mind

  • Command-line execution avoids PcaAppLaunchDic.txt entirely, with no effort. An intruder who knows the artifact only has to use cmd.exe.
  • Editing or deleting the files. They are plain text in C:\Windows; an administrator can change them. Compare with the USN journal, Volume Shadow Copies and the per-user keys.
  • Stopping PcaSvc or setting the "Turn off Program Compatibility Assistant" policy. Check the service's state and the System log's service control events, as described in why a program is missing from PCA.
  • A non-ANSI path, deliberate or not, stops new lines being added. Look for a line with no pipe.

Writing it up

  • State what the artifact shows: "PcaAppLaunchDic.txt on FIN-WKS-07 records C:\Users\Public\rclone.exe with a last launch time of 2026-09-14 10:47:12 UTC." Not "svc_backup exfiltrated data at 10:47".
  • Say that the time is the last recorded GUI launch, that it is UTC according to published research, and that Microsoft does not document the file.
  • Say where the user came from, for each program.
  • List the expected absences, so that a reader does not take a missing line as proof that a tool did not run.

FAQ

Does a line in PcaAppLaunchDic.txt prove that a program ran?

It shows that the program at that path was launched from the graphical shell, and when it was last launched. It does not show what the program did, whether it succeeded, or who started it. Corroborate it with Prefetch, BAM, event logs or the file itself before you build on it.

How do I find which user ran a program listed in PCA?

The Windows 11 PCA files have no user. Use the path when it is inside a profile, then the per-user registry: the Compatibility Assistant Store and Layers keys in each NTUSER.DAT, UserAssist and RunMRU. BAM in the SYSTEM hive keeps entries per SID. Logon sessions from the Security log tell you who could have been at the screen.

Why is PsExec missing from PCA when Prefetch shows it?

Because it was started from a command line. In Sygnia's tests, programs started from a command line, a scheduled task or remotely with PsExec were not recorded in the PCA files. Prefetch records any process start when prefetching is on, and BAM records programs run in a user's session.

Can PCA show that data was exfiltrated?

No. It can show that a tool such as rclone was launched, and when. What the tool did comes from other sources: its configuration and logs, network and proxy records, file system activity, cloud provider logs.

Frequently asked questions

Does a line in PcaAppLaunchDic.txt prove that a program ran?

It shows that the program at that path was launched from the graphical shell, and when it was last launched. It does not show what the program did, whether it succeeded, or who started it. Corroborate it with Prefetch, BAM, event logs or the file itself before you build on it.

How do I find which user ran a program listed in PCA?

The Windows 11 PCA files have no user. Use the path when it is inside a profile, then the per-user registry: the Compatibility Assistant Store and Layers keys in each NTUSER.DAT, UserAssist and RunMRU. BAM in the SYSTEM hive keeps entries per SID. Logon sessions from the Security log tell you who could have been at the screen.

Why is PsExec missing from PCA when Prefetch shows it?

Because it was started from a command line. In Sygnia's tests, programs started from a command line, a scheduled task or remotely with PsExec were not recorded in the PCA files. Prefetch records any process start when prefetching is on, and BAM records programs run in a user's session.

Can PCA show that data was exfiltrated?

No. It can show that a tool such as rclone was launched, and when. What the tool did comes from other sources: its configuration and logs, network and proxy records, file system activity, cloud provider logs.

Related articles

What PcaAppLaunchDic.txt records on Windows 11 22H2 and later: one line per program launched from the GUI, its last launch time in UTC, and its limits.
How to read PcaGeneralDb0.txt and PcaGeneralDb1.txt on Windows 11: the eight fields, record types 0 to 4, redacted paths, rotation, and what is still unknown.
The per-user Compatibility Assistant keys: Persisted on Windows Vista and 7, Store on Windows 8 to 11, what their values show and what is undocumented.