Investigating Program Execution with PCA Traces
Use the Windows 11 PCA files and AppCompatFlags keys in an intrusion: what to flag, what is missing and why, how to find the user, with a worked example.
TL;DR. In a Windows 11 intrusion, sort PcaAppLaunchDic.txt by time and start with programs in Downloads, ProgramData, Users\Public and other writable folders, double extensions, and dual-use tools such as rclone. Then think about what is missing: a child process or a tool started from cmd.exe never gets a line, so PCA is half of the story at best. The files have no user; take it from the path, from each NTUSER.DAT (Compatibility Assistant Store, Layers, UserAssist, RunMRU) and from BAM. Times are last launches, in UTC. PCA Parser joins the files and hives per executable, shows the timeline and flags the paths and events worth a look; the FIN-WKS-07 case below shows the method.
Where PCA fits
| Source | What it adds |
|---|---|
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt | Last GUI launch per path, machine-wide, UTC |
PcaGeneralDb0.txt, PcaGeneralDb1.txt | Abnormal exits with exit codes, failed installers, PCA events, with product and program ID |
| Compatibility Assistant Store (NTUSER.DAT) | Programs PCA dealt with for one user |
| AppCompatFlags Layers (NTUSER.DAT, SOFTWARE) | Programs someone set to run elevated or in a compatibility mode |
| Prefetch, BAM | Execution regardless of how the program was started; BAM per user |
| Amcache, the file itself | Hash, signature, version, Mark of the Web |
| Event logs, EDR | Process creation with parent and command line, logons |
What to look for
| Check | Why it matters | Benign look-alikes |
|---|---|---|
Executable in Downloads, %TEMP%, AppData, C:\Users\Public | Folders any user can write to, where dropped tools land | Installers and updaters; Rathbun's published file has setup programs under ProgramData\Package Cache and an NVIDIA downloader |
Executable directly in a C:\ProgramData subfolder named after a vendor | A folder that looks like it belongs to installed software | Real vendor components; check what the vendor installs there |
Double extension (.pdf.exe, .docx.exe) | A file made to look like a document | Rare |
Drive letter other than C: | Removable media or a mapped share | Portable apps, software on a second disk |
| Dual-use tools: rclone, PsExec, archivers, remote-access tools | Exfiltration, lateral movement, staging | Administrators |
| First seen in the incident window | New program, new behaviour | Updates, new software |
Abnormal exits in PcaGeneralDb for the same path | Crashes, a tool killed by security software | Buggy software |
| RUNASADMIN or RUNASINVOKER layer on a writable path | Someone wanted the tool elevated, or wanted to avoid a prompt | Old software and games |
A line with no pipe in PcaAppLaunchDic.txt | Recording of new programs stopped there | A legitimate path with a non-ANSI character |
None of these is a verdict on its own. Two or three on one path are worth a full look.
Worked example: FIN-WKS-07
FIN-WKS-07 is a fictional Windows 11 workstation; the people, account, files and times are invented and match the other examples on this site. On 2026-09-14, the finance user alice opens a fake invoice, and later a rogue local account, svc_backup, is used interactively to run tools and stage data. The responder collects the PCA folder, both users' NTUSER.DAT, the SOFTWARE and SYSTEM hives and the Prefetch folder at 10:55:12 UTC. All times below are UTC.
Step 1: read the launch log in time order
| Last launch | Path |
|---|---|
| 08:58:40 | C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\OUTLOOK.EXE |
| 09:12:07 | C:\Users\alice\Downloads\Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe |
| 10:09:44 | C:\ProgramData\Intel\m64.exe |
| 10:39:25 | C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7zFM.exe |
| 10:47:12 | C:\Users\Public\rclone.exe |
Step 2: flag the paths
Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exein alice's Downloads: a double extension and a download folder, 13 minutes after Outlook started. That fits an attachment saved and opened. Check the file'sZone.Identifierstream and Amcache for its SHA-1.C:\ProgramData\Intel\m64.exe: an executable directly in a folder named after a hardware vendor, started from File Explorer at 10:09:44.C:\Users\Public\rclone.exe: a file-sync tool often used for exfiltration, in a folder every user can write to.7zFM.exeis an ordinary program. What matters is when it ran: after 10:00, after svc_backup's first logon at 09:59:28.
Step 3: account for what is missing
Five known events have no line, and each absence is expected:
powershell.exeat 09:12:31 was started by the invoice executable. A child process is not a GUI shell launch. Look for it in Prefetch and in process creation events.cmd.exeat 10:02:16 (opened from the Run dialog) andmstsc.exeat 10:18:40 both live inSystem32. Sygnia found that some built-in programs are not recorded when they run from their original folder, and no public test shows a Run dialog launch being recorded. BAM under svc_backup's SID has both; RunMRU in its hive has the Run dialog command.C:\Users\svc_backup\Downloads\tools\PsExec64.exeat 10:21:03 was started from cmd.exe. Sygnia found that command-line launches and PsExec are not recorded. BAM, under svc_backup's SID, and Prefetch have it.- An earlier 7-Zip launch. svc_backup's Windows Timeline in the same case shows 7-Zip File Manager opening
Downloads\tools.zipat 10:06:40.PcaAppLaunchDic.txtkeeps one time per path, so only 10:39:25 is left.
How every source behaves is in why a program is missing from PCA.
Step 4: attribute each launch
PcaAppLaunchDic.txt is one file for the whole machine. User attribution comes from elsewhere:
| Path | User | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe | alice | Path in her profile; her NTUSER.DAT |
m64.exe | svc_backup | Layers value ~ RUNASADMIN for this path in svc_backup's NTUSER.DAT, key LastWrite 10:10:05 |
7zFM.exe, rclone.exe | svc_backup | BAM entries under svc_backup's SID |
PsExec64.exe | svc_backup | Path in its profile; BAM |
The Layers value is the strongest link for m64.exe. svc_backup's profile was created during the intrusion, so its Layers key holds one value, and the key's LastWrite time, 10:10:05, is when someone in that session asked for m64.exe to always run as administrator: 21 seconds after its GUI launch. See AppCompatFlags Layers. Also read the Compatibility Assistant Store key in both hives: a path there ties it to the user whose hive it is.
Step 5: check the PcaGeneralDb files
Search both PcaGeneralDb files for m64.exe, rclone.exe and invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe. Paths there are lowercased, have no drive letter, and use %USERPROFILE% or %USERNAME% in place of the profile (PcaGeneralDb files). On FIN-WKS-07, PcaGeneralDb0.txt has two of them:
2026-09-14 09:12:34.118|2|%USERPROFILE%\downloads\invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe||||000645a9861156f0839a208ca20d51185d4800000904|Abnormal process exit with code 0x1
2026-09-14 10:09:46.207|2|%programdata%\intel\m64.exe||||00067be110d23f04885a6fc8fb6d093ea50a00000904|Abnormal process exit with code 0xc000042c
- The invoice executable ended abnormally 27 seconds after its launch, after starting PowerShell. The empty product, company and version fields fit a file with no version information.
m64.exeexited two seconds after its launch with0xc000042c, STATUS_ELEVATION_REQUIRED, and the RUNASADMIN value in svc_backup's hive was written 19 seconds later. It reads as someone retrying with elevation: a lead to check against the Security log and Prefetch, not proof on its own.
rclone.exe has no record, which is the normal case for a program that exited cleanly.
The timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 08:58:40 | alice starts Outlook | PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
| 09:12:07 | alice opens Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe from Downloads | PcaAppLaunchDic.txt, path in her profile |
| 09:12:31 | powershell.exe started by the invoice | Not in PCA: Prefetch, process creation events |
| 09:12:34 | The invoice executable exits abnormally (code 0x1) | PcaGeneralDb0.txt, type 2 |
| 09:57:41 | Local account svc_backup created | Security log (4720) |
| 09:59:28 | svc_backup logs on interactively | Security log (4624) |
| 10:02:16 | cmd.exe from the Run dialog | Not in PCA: BAM, RunMRU |
| 10:06:40 | 7-Zip opens tools.zip | Windows Timeline (overwritten in PCA) |
| 10:09:44 | m64.exe started from File Explorer | PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
| 10:09:46 | m64.exe exits, elevation required (0xc000042c) | PcaGeneralDb0.txt, type 2 |
| 10:10:05 | RUNASADMIN set for m64.exe | Layers key LastWrite, svc_backup's NTUSER.DAT |
| 10:18:40 | mstsc.exe started | Not in PCA: BAM |
| 10:21:03 | PsExec64.exe started from cmd.exe | Not in PCA: BAM, Prefetch |
| 10:39:25 | 7-Zip File Manager, last launch | PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
| 10:47:12 | rclone.exe started from C:\Users\Public | PcaAppLaunchDic.txt |
| 10:55:12 | Collection | Responder's notes |
Pivots
From a suspicious path:
- The file. Hash, signature, version information,
Zone.Identifier, file system times. If it is gone, Amcache may still have its SHA-1. - Prefetch. Run count and up to eight run times, which PCA does not keep, and the files the program loaded.
- The user's hive. Compatibility Assistant Store, Layers, UserAssist, RunMRU; for
mstsc.exe, the Terminal Server Client keys that list the servers the user connected to. - BAM. The last run per path, per SID.
- Event logs and EDR. Process creation with parent and command line, if they were enabled.
- Other hosts.
mstsc.exeand PsExec point to the next machine to examine.
Anti-forensics to keep in mind
- Command-line execution avoids
PcaAppLaunchDic.txtentirely, with no effort. An intruder who knows the artifact only has to use cmd.exe. - Editing or deleting the files. They are plain text in
C:\Windows; an administrator can change them. Compare with the USN journal, Volume Shadow Copies and the per-user keys. - Stopping PcaSvc or setting the "Turn off Program Compatibility Assistant" policy. Check the service's state and the System log's service control events, as described in why a program is missing from PCA.
- A non-ANSI path, deliberate or not, stops new lines being added. Look for a line with no pipe.
Writing it up
- State what the artifact shows: "
PcaAppLaunchDic.txton FIN-WKS-07 recordsC:\Users\Public\rclone.exewith a last launch time of 2026-09-14 10:47:12 UTC." Not "svc_backup exfiltrated data at 10:47". - Say that the time is the last recorded GUI launch, that it is UTC according to published research, and that Microsoft does not document the file.
- Say where the user came from, for each program.
- List the expected absences, so that a reader does not take a missing line as proof that a tool did not run.
FAQ
Does a line in PcaAppLaunchDic.txt prove that a program ran?
It shows that the program at that path was launched from the graphical shell, and when it was last launched. It does not show what the program did, whether it succeeded, or who started it. Corroborate it with Prefetch, BAM, event logs or the file itself before you build on it.
How do I find which user ran a program listed in PCA?
The Windows 11 PCA files have no user. Use the path when it is inside a profile, then the per-user registry: the Compatibility Assistant Store and Layers keys in each NTUSER.DAT, UserAssist and RunMRU. BAM in the SYSTEM hive keeps entries per SID. Logon sessions from the Security log tell you who could have been at the screen.
Why is PsExec missing from PCA when Prefetch shows it?
Because it was started from a command line. In Sygnia's tests, programs started from a command line, a scheduled task or remotely with PsExec were not recorded in the PCA files. Prefetch records any process start when prefetching is on, and BAM records programs run in a user's session.
Can PCA show that data was exfiltrated?
No. It can show that a tool such as rclone was launched, and when. What the tool did comes from other sources: its configuration and logs, network and proxy records, file system activity, cloud provider logs.
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Frequently asked questions
Does a line in PcaAppLaunchDic.txt prove that a program ran?
It shows that the program at that path was launched from the graphical shell, and when it was last launched. It does not show what the program did, whether it succeeded, or who started it. Corroborate it with Prefetch, BAM, event logs or the file itself before you build on it.
How do I find which user ran a program listed in PCA?
The Windows 11 PCA files have no user. Use the path when it is inside a profile, then the per-user registry: the Compatibility Assistant Store and Layers keys in each NTUSER.DAT, UserAssist and RunMRU. BAM in the SYSTEM hive keeps entries per SID. Logon sessions from the Security log tell you who could have been at the screen.
Why is PsExec missing from PCA when Prefetch shows it?
Because it was started from a command line. In Sygnia's tests, programs started from a command line, a scheduled task or remotely with PsExec were not recorded in the PCA files. Prefetch records any process start when prefetching is on, and BAM records programs run in a user's session.
Can PCA show that data was exfiltrated?
No. It can show that a tool such as rclone was launched, and when. What the tool did comes from other sources: its configuration and logs, network and proxy records, file system activity, cloud provider logs.